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When data on actual choices are not available, researchers studying preferences sometimes pose choice
scenarios and ask respondents to state the actions they would choose if they were to face these scenarios.
The data on stated choices are then used to estimate random utility models, as if they are data on actual
choices. Stated choices may differ from actual ones because researchers typically provide respondents
with less information than they would have facing actual choice problems. Elicitation of choice probabilities
overcomes this problem by permitting respondents to express uncertainty about their behavior. This
paper shows how to use elicited choice probabilities to estimate random utility models with random



















  When suitable data on actual choices are not available, researchers studying consumer 
preferences sometimes pose hypothetical choice scenarios and ask respondents to state the 
actions they would choose if they were to face these scenarios.  The data on stated choices are 
then used to estimate random utility models, in the same manner as are data on actual choices.  
See, for example, Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981), Fischer and Nagin (1981), Louviere and 
Woodworth (1983), Manski and Salomon (1987), and Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990). 
  Manski (1999) reasoned that stated choices may differ from actual ones because 
researchers provide respondents with different information than they have when facing actual 
choice problems.  The norm has been to pose incomplete scenarios, ones in which respondents 
are given only a subset of the information they would have in actual choice settings.  When 
scenarios are incomplete, stated choices cannot be more than point predictions of actual choices. 
 Elicitation  of  choice probabilities overcomes the inadequacy of stated-choice analysis by 
permitting respondents to express uncertainty about their behavior in incomplete scenarios.   
Manski (1999) sketched how elicited choice probabilities may be used to estimate random utility 
models with random coefficients.  This paper further develops the approach and reports the first 
empirical implementation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the random utility model usually used in 
the analysis of stated choice data is presented. Assuming an extreme value distribution of the 
random utility term leads to the standard multinomial logit model and to the mixed-logit model 
when the utility function has random coefficients. In Section 3, the advantages of eliciting choice 
probabilities as opposed to stated choices are discussed and it is shown that estimation of the utility function parameters is simpler and relies on weaker distributional assumptions. 
In Section 4, we apply the "elicited choice probability" methodology to estimate 
preferences for reliability in the supply of electricity to households in Israel. We describe the 
process of eliciting choice probabilities in hypothetical scenarios from a sample of households 
and analyze their responses. We then use the elicited choice probabilities to estimate mean 
preferences and willingness to pay for reductions in the duration or frequency of electricity 
outages. We also present estimates of individual preferences which are derived from the model 
in a straightforward manner.  Conclusions close the paper. 
 
 
2. Econometric Analysis of Stated Choices 
 
 Let  i denote an individual asked to respond to a choice scenario.  In standard stated-
choice analysis, the respondent is presented with J hypothetical alternatives, j = 1, . . . , J and is 
asked to choose one.  Let yi denote the stated choice.  Let person i have observed attributes si.  
Let each alternative j presented to person i have stated characteristics vij.  For example, in a study 
of preferences for electricity reliability, the alternatives may differ in the stated duration and 
frequency of electricity outages and in the price of electricity. 
  It is common to assume that the utility of alternative j has the random-coefficients form 
 
                                              Uij  =  xijβi  +  εij .                                 (1) 
 
Here xij = x(vij, si) is a specified function of observed alternative characteristics and personal 
  2attributes, while εij is a utility component that is observed by the decision maker but not by the 
researcher.  Let xi  ≡ (xij ,j = 1, . . . , J) .  It is also common to assume that εi  ≡  (εij ,j = 1, . . . , J) 
are independent and identically distributed (i. i. d.) conditional on xi, with the Type I extreme 
value distribution.  Then the probability of stating choice j conditional on xi and βi has the 

















.                                      (2) 
 
Finally, assume that β is statistically independent of x, with density ) | ( θ β f  across the 
population of potential respondents, where the form of f is known up to the parameter vector θ.  
This yields the mixed-logit model of McFadden and Train (2000): 
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These choice probabilities provide the basis for estimation of the parameters θ by maximum 
likelihood or another method. 
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3. Econometric Analysis of Elicited Choice Probabilities 
 
3.1. Elicited Choice Probabilities and Stated Choices 
 
  Stated choice analysis assumes that individual i responding to a choice scenario knows 
the value of both xi and εi, and, hence, is able to state a definite utility-maximizing choice.  
However, the researcher only provides the stated characteristics vi ≡ (vij, j = 1,  . . , J), which 
determine xi but not εi.  It is therefore questionable that the respondent knows εi when the 
scenario is posed. 
  Eliciting choice probabilities enables respondents to express uncertainty about εi.  It 
permits a person to treat εi as a vector of utility components whose value need not be known 
when responding to the choice scenario, but which would be known in an actual choice setting.  
Formally, suppose that person i forms a subjective distribution for εi, derives the subjective 
probability that he would choose each alternative in an actual choice setting, and reports these 
subjective probabilities to the researcher.  Let qij denote the choice probability reported by person 
i for alternative j.  Then qij is the subjective probability that person i places on the event that the 
realizations of εi will make option j optimal. 
Suppose in particular that person i has utility function (1) and, given the stated 
characteristics vi, places a continuous subjective distribution Qi on εi.  Then his subjective choice 
probability for alternative j is 
 
 qij  =  Qi[xijβi + εij > xikβi + εik, all k ≠ j].                                    (4) 
  4 
The right-hand side of (4) gives a subjective random utility interpretation of elicited choice 
probabilities. 
Subjective distribution Qi expresses resolvable uncertainty; that is, uncertainty about 
utility components that are not stated in the choice scenario but that would be known in an actual 
choice setting.   A person contemplating a choice scenario may also face unresolvable 
uncertainty.  That is, there may be utility components that the person believes would remain 
unknown in an actual choice setting.  The usual economic assumption is that a person copes with 
unresolvable uncertainty by maximizing subjective expected utility.   If a person only faces 
unresolvable uncertainty when responding to the choice scenario, he would place subjective 
probability one on the alternative that maximizes expected utility. 
It is important to understand how elicited choice probabilities and stated choices are 
related to one another.  Assuming that persons form subjective distributions in the manner 
described above, Juster (1966) and Manski (1990) reasoned that a person asked a stated-choice 
question computes his subjective choice probability for each alternative and reports the one with 
the highest probability.  Thus, when person i states that he would choose alternative j, he means 
that qij ≥ q ik, all k ≠ j.  He does not necessarily mean that Uij ≥ Uik, all k ≠ j, as assumed in 
standard stated choice analysis.  The latter assumption is essentially correct only when qij = 1, 
which means that person i places subjective probability one on the event (Uij ≥ Uik, all k ≠ j).
1
The above reasoning implies that the standard derivation of the mixed-logit model, 
described in Section 2, is valid only when the subjective choice probabilities of all respondents 
take the extreme values zero and one.  Suppose to the contrary that a group of respondents place 
                                                  
1 We say that the assumption is “essentially correct” because the utility inequalities hold with subjective probability 
one, not with certainty. 
  5a non-extreme subjective probability, say 0.6, on choosing alternative j.  If asked to state their 
choices, all of these respondents would state that they would choose j, and the standard 
derivation assumes that all of them would choose j in actuality.  However, if respondents have 
accurate expectations and if their realizations of ε are statistically independent, then only 0.6 of 
them would actually choose j. 
Eliciting choice probabilities is more informative than asking for stated choices. When a 
person is sure that he would choose option j, he can express this belief by placing probability one 
on j.  When he is uncertain whether he would choose j, he can report a non-extreme choice 
probability. 
A person reporting non-extreme probabilities expresses the belief that, in an actual choice 
setting, he would possess choice-relevant information beyond the characteristics vi provided to 
him in the choice scenario; that is, some of the uncertainty he faces is resolvable.  Equation (4) 
quantifies the information that person i anticipates learning in an actual choice setting.  If he 
believes that he would acquire no further information in an actual setting, then Qi is degenerate 
and he reports extreme choice probabilities.  If he believes that he might obtain information that 
would affect his choice, then Qi is non-degenerate and he reports non-extreme choice 
probabilities. 
 
 3.2. The Linear Mixed Logit Subjective Random Utility Model  
 
  To use elicited choice probabilities to estimate the subjective random utility model (4) 
requires assumptions on the subjective distribution Qi that each respondent i places on εi and 
assumptions on the cross-sectional distribution of the random coefficients β.  This subsection and 
  6the next pose assumptions similar to those maintained in standard stated-choice analysis.  The 
result is an extremely simple form of econometric analysis.  Section 3.4 considers weaker 
assumptions that may be more credible. 
The standard practice in stated-choice analysis has been to assume that the components of 
(εij, j = 1, . . . , J) are objectively i. i. d. with the extreme value distribution.  Suppose that 
respondents make the same assumption subjectively.  Then the choice probabilities (4) have the 
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where ii b β η =+,  1 () ij ij i i ux x , η =−  and the alternative designated j = 1 is arbitrarily chosen. 
Standard analysis of stated choices assumes that the cross-sectional distribution of β, 
hence η, is statistically independent of x.  Let this assumption hold.
2  Without loss of generality, 
set E(η) = 0 as a normalization.   It then follows that b = E(β), E(u│x) = 0, and (6) is the linear 
mean regression model 
                                                  
2 In the application of Section 4, the attributes v of the hypothetical alternatives are randomly drawn; hence, η is 
statistically independent of v. We will assume that η is statistically independent of the observed personal attributes s 
that are determinants of x; hence, η is statistically independent of x in our application. 
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3.3. Rounding and Symmetry of Preferences 
 
If model (7) is taken literally, the mean-preference parameters b may be consistently 
estimated by least squares, without need to assume anything about the shape of the distribution 
of β.  This contrasts with standard econometric analysis of stated choices, where the researcher 
must specify a parametric family of distributions for β.  
However, we cannot take the model quite literally.  As will be discussed in Section 4, 
respondents tend to round their responses to the nearest five or ten percent.  Such minor rounding 
has been found to be commonplace in elicitation of subjective probabilities; see Manski (2004) 
and Manski and Molinari (2008). 
  Rounding of interior subjective probabilities (say, from 43 percent to 45 percent) is 
relatively unproblematic.  However, rounding of values near zero and one raises a serious 
difficulty due to the sensitivity of the log odd function near the boundaries of the [0, 1] interval.  
At the extreme, some respondents report subjective choice probabilities equal to zero or one, thus 
generating log odds that equal minus or plus infinity.  Hence, least squares estimation breaks 
down.
3
  The inference problem created by rounding of small (large) subjective probabilities to 
 
3 One should not drop the cases with choice probabilities equal to zero or one, because this truncates the sample in a 
response-based manner.  One might consider an ad hoc transformation of reported zeroes and ones to values near 
these boundaries, but the least squares estimates are sensitive to the transformation performed. 
 
  8zero (one) can be resolved if preferences are symmetrically distributed with center at b. 
Symmetry of preferences has been a common assumption in stated-choice analysis, which 
typically supposes that β has a normal distribution.  Symmetry implies that the unobserved uij are 
symmetrically distributed about zero conditional on xi and, hence, have median zero conditional 














                                                 (8) 
 
whose parameters may be estimated by least absolute deviations (LAD) in the absence of 
rounding. 
  A well-known robustness property of the median of a random variable is its invariance to 
transformations that do not alter the ordering of values relative to the median.  Thus, if y is a 
random variable with median M, then M is also the median of any function f(y) such that 
 and    This holds even if the function f transforms small 
values of y to -∞ and large ones to ∞.  Hence, equation (8) continues to be the same linear 
median regression if small values of q are replaced by zero and large values by one. 
() yM f y M <⇒ < () . yM f y M >⇒ >
  In the application of Section 4 we will assume that preferences are symmetrically 
distributed.  When a reported subjective probability is zero or one, we transform it to a value 
close to zero or one.  We then estimate model (8) by LAD, whose result is insensitive to the 
specific transformation used.  For brevity, we will continue to refer to b as the “mean 
preferences” rather than the more cumbersome “center of symmetry of the preference 
distribution.” 
 
  93.4. Models with Weaker Assumptions on Respondent Beliefs 
The linear mixed logit model derived above has many appealing properties. The basic 
rm of
metric analysis of stated choices.  
As disc






fo  the model presented in Section 3.2 places no restrictions on the population distribution of 
preference parameters and is easily estimable by least squares.  The robust-to-rounding version 
of the model developed in Section 3.3 requires only that the distribution of preferences be 
symmetric and is easily estimable by least absolute deviations. 
These properties compare favorably with standard econo
ussed in Section 3.1, the standard approach is valid only when respondents are certain of 
their stated choices.  It requires specification of a parametric family for the distribution of 
preferences.  Moreover, it requires often difficult numerical maximization of a likelihood 
function or solution of a set of nonlinear moment equations. 
Perhaps the main unappealing feature of the linear m
h respondent i believes (εij, j = 1, . . . , J) to be i. i. d. with the extreme value distribution.  
This distributional assumption is highly convenient.  As a consequence, it has been prominent as 
an assumption on the objective distribution of ε from the original conditional logit model of 
McFadden (1974) through the more recent mixed-logit model of McFadden and Train (2000).  
However, convenience does not make an assumption credible.  Previous applications of the 
assumption have not been able to motivate it persuasively.  Neither can we. 
Cognizant of the problem, econometricians have over the years d
hes to discrete choice analysis that rest on more credible, albeit less convenient, 
assumptions about objective probability distributions; see, for example, Manski (1975, 2007), 
Horowitz (1992), and Matzkin (1992).  These approaches can also be applied in the present 
  10setting, which requires assumptions on subjective distributions.  We discuss one here. 
 
Maximum Score Estimation of Subjective Random Utility Models 
 k), Manski (1999) suggested 
assumi
x x
Considering a binary choice setting with alternatives (j,
ng only that each person i places subjective median zero on εij − εik and that the cross-
sectional distribution of β is symmetric.  The first assumption yields the inequality 
 
0.5 ( ) 0. i ij ij ik q β ≥⇔− ≥                                           (9) 
 
he second assumption yields the inequality 
0 . x x x b ≥≥ ⇔ − ≥                          (10) 
 
oited to estimate b by the maximum score method (Manski, 1975, 
Indeed, inequality (10) may be applied to stated-choice data as well as to elicited choice 
 against the fact that 
T
 
(0 . 5 | ) 0 . 5 ( ) ij ij ik Pq
 Inequality (10) can be expl
1985). 
 
probabilities.  As discussed in Section 3.1, a person’s statement that he would choose option j 
over k means that qij ≥ 0.5.  Hence, the maximum score method can be used to estimate a 
subjective random utility model with stated choice data.  In contrast with the standard approach, 
one need not assume that respondents are certain about their stated choices. 
  These nice features of maximum score estimation must be balanced
inequality (9) point-identifies b only if the attributes x have sufficiently rich support, as 
explained in Manski (1988) and elsewhere.  Researchers typically present only a finite set of 
  11distinct choice scenarios to respondents, which do not suffice for point identification.  One may, 
nevertheless, exploit (9) to bound b.  The maximum score method consistently estimates the 
bounds.  We give an illustrative application in Section 4.7. 
 
 
4. Estimating Preferences for Electricity Reliability 
We have applied the “elicited-choice-probabilities” approach to estimate consumer 
valuatio
ies using the stated-choice approach.  Section 4.2 describes 
our res
.1. Stated-Choice Studies 
 
Various theoretical and applied models have been developed in the resource and energy 
 
n of residential electricity reliability in Israel. Knowledge of consumer willingness to pay 
for reliability is an important component of a rational planning strategy for capacity investment 
in the generation and transportation of electricity, as well as a key factor in determining an 
optimal electricity pricing schedule. 
Section 4.1 cites previous stud
earch design.  Section 4.3 reports basic findings on the elicited choice probabilities.   
Section 4.4 presents estimates of the mean consumer preferences β in models of form (8).   
Section 4.5 derives estimates of willingness-to-pay for electricity reliability by persons with the 
mean preferences.  Section 4.6 presents findings on the dispersion of preferences.  Finally, 
Section 4.7 uses the maximum score method to estimate a simple version of the model with 
weakened assumptions discussed in Section 3.4.  
 
4
  12literature to estimate the marginal value of service reliability.
4  Models have often been 
stimated using stated-choice data, with customers asked to choose among different bundles of 
service
of Israeli households to pay for reduced power outages. They found the conjoint 
analysi
In the present study, a stratified random sample of 557 Israeli households was drawn and 
an adult member of each household was interviewed in person about his or her preferences for 
reliability of home electricity supply.  The interviews were performed in summer 2005 by a 
                                                
e
 attributes.  Important stated attributes include the number and duration of outages, as well 
as the cost of service.  Revelt and Train (1998) and Goett et al. (2002) used stated-choice data to 
estimate mixed logit models of the type described in equation (3).  Cai et al. (1998) used a 
different methodology -- an extension of the “double-bounded” procedure used in studies of 
contingent valuation of natural resources -- to estimate willingness to pay for electricity service 
attributes.   
A previous study of the Israeli electricity market was conducted by Beenstock et al. 
(1998). They used both conjoint analysis and contingent-valuation data to estimate the 
willingness 
s more reliable. Here, they asked consumers to rank the hypothetical alternatives and they 
analyzed the rank-ordered data. Their estimates indicate that the perceived cost of unsupplied 
electricity to Israeli households in 1991 was between 2.3 US dollars per KWh (in the 
spring/autumn during morning/midday hours) and 11 dollars per KWh (in the winter during 
afternoon/evening hours). 
 
4.2. Study Design 
 
 
4   See Caves et al. (1990) for a comparison of the different approaches and Lawton et al. (2003) for a recent 
review of U.S. results. 
  13professional survey research firm, with responses recorded on laptop computers using Computer 
ssisted Personal Interview (CAPI) software. 
 
es. Each alternative is characterized by a different 
bi-monthly electricity bill and by different numbers of outages and different average duration of 
the out
choosing one of the two alternatives. The chance of each alternative should be a number between 
you give a 5% chance to one alternative it means that there is almost no possibility that you will 
ternative it 
means that almost surely you will choose it."  
arameters of a random utility model.
0 minutes, and 120 to 240 minutes.  In our analysis, we 
took th
                                                
A
Each respondent was asked to report choice probabilities in ten different “games.”  A 
game specifies a scenario in which the person is presented with two alternative bundles of 
attributes (J = 2) and is asked to state his or her chances of choosing each alternative. 
  The games were introduced as follows: 
"In each game we will show you two alternativ
ages. In each game, you should evaluate what is the chance in percentage terms of 
0 and 100 and the chances given to the two alternatives should add up to 100. For example, if 
choose that alternative. On the other hand, if you give an 80% or over chance to an al
 
Since the early 1990s, economists have developed considerable experience similarly asking 
respondents to state expectations of future events as the “percent chance” that the event will 
occur; Manski (2004) reviews the literature.  The novelty in the present study is our use of 
responses to this type of question as a replacement for actual choice data to estimate the 
5 p
In each game, the alternatives presented to sample members differed in the duration (D) 
and frequency (F) of outages and in the corresponding electricity bill (C).  Thus, a stated 
alternative is a (D, F, C) triple. The stated frequencies of outages were 0 (perfect reliability), 1, 2, 
4, 5 and 8 outages per season. The duration of an outage was stated as an interval of length 0 to 
10 minutes, 10 to 60 minutes, 60 to 12
e duration to be the mid-point of the interval; that is, 5, 35, 90 or 180 minutes.  The stated 
 
5 Delavande (2008) uses a different type of probabilistic expectations data to estimate a random utility model.  She 
has data on actual choices and uses elicited expectations to characterize the attributes of alternatives. 
  14electricity bill (C) took one of five values: the household’s actual electricity bill, 15 or 40 percent 
above the actual bill, or 10 or 20 percent below the actual bill.  The stated combinations of (D, F, 
C) were randomly generated, but dominated alternatives were excluded. 
  The value that a person attaches to electricity reliability may depend on the timing of 
outages.  For example, an anticipated outage at 11 AM on a weekday in the summer may be 
valued differently than an unanticipated outage at 8 PM on a weekend day in the winter.  To 
assess the variation of valuation with timing, each game was set in a scenario characterized by 
three timing variables. The first timing variable is season: 50 percent of the games were set in the 
e 360 NIS. In alternative 2 you 
summer, 41 percent in the winter, and 9 percent were set in the spring (fall is very short in 
Israel). The second variable relates to the time of day when outages occur: during peak hours (39 
percent), off-peak hours (30 percent), or intermediate hours (31 percent).  The third timing 
variable refers to the days of the week, specifically whether outages occur during the weekend or 
not. An additional characteristic of the scenario is the availability of advance warning on the 
outages. This feature was present in only 9 percent of the games. 
  To illustrate, here is how a typical game was described: 
 
“Suppose you are in the summer and all the outages occur between 5PM and 10PM (peak hour 
in summer) during weekends and there is no advance warning. In alternative 1 you are offered 5 
outages lasting up to 10 minutes each and the electricity bill will b
are offered 0 outages and the electricity bill will be 480 NIS.” 
 
The abbreviation NIS stands for New Israeli Shekel, the currency unit.  One NIS was worth 
about 22 US cents when the survey was administered in the summer of 2005. 
  15The games were played in 10 out of the 36 possible scenarios. These were the scenarios 
deemed to be of greatest interest and/or relevance for analysis.  (For example, all weekend hours 
ere considered off-peak.)  In order not to confuse the respondent by changing the timing 
os changed across 
respond
e regularity and have occurred even more frequently in the 
past.  T
 games and 38 (6.8 percent) gave 
sponses in nine games.  In all, 5430 responses were obtained from the 557 sample members.  
s 5430/5570 = 0.975.   
Let qi1 and qi2 denote the choice probabilities (percent chance divided by 100) for the two 
alternat
w
scenario in each game, the same scenario was maintained during 5 successive games. Thus, a 
respondent plays 5 different games in each of two scenarios. The scenari
ents to cover the ten timing possibilities of interest. These scenarios and their frequency 
in the sample are listed in Table 1. 
We believe the scenarios posed to be realistic in the Israel context.  There has been an 
ongoing public debate in Israel about problems in generating the amount of electricity needed to 
satisfy growing demand.  During the summer, in particular, newspapers are full of alarming news 
about warnings from the electricity company that it will not be able to generate enough 
electricity.  Outages occur with som
hus, we think that the survey respondents are not surprised when presented with scenarios 
where outages occur in different frequencies and durations. 
 
4.3. The Elicited Choice Probabilities 
 
The response rate to the questions posed was very high.  Of the 557 sample members, 
500 (89.8 percent) reported choice probabilities in all ten
re
Thus, the overall item response rate wa
ives elicited from individual i in a given game.  In all cases, we have qi2 = 1 - qi1.  That is, 
  16the elicited choice probabilities always add up to 1. 
The elicited percent-chance responses for alternative 1 are tabulated in Table 2 and their 
histogram is shown in Figure 1. The table and figure show that most responses are multiples of 
ten and
ential for our analysis, but gross rounding 
would 
nt responses were 20 
and 80
at least 0.84 of the cases.  We say 
“at lea
pute these estimates, we replace reported zero probabilities by 0.001 
 almost all of the rest are multiples of five.  The bimodality of the histogram in the figure 
reflects the random assignment of the stated characteristics of alternatives. 
Minor rounding of responses is inconsequ
be problematic.  It is therefore important to observe that the data do not show evidence of 
gross rounding.  In particular, the elicited choice probabilities are not concentrated at the values 
0, 50, and 100; the frequencies of these responses are just 0.08, 0.05, and 0.08 respectively.  
Instead, the distribution of responses is weakly bimodal.  The most prevale
 percent, with response frequencies of 0.118 and 0.119. 
Table 2 shows the importance of eliciting choice probabilities rather than stated choices.  
A stated choice question only permits the respondent to state a 0 or 100 percent chance of 
choosing an alternative.  When given the opportunity to state a value in the [0, 1] interior, sample 
members state an interior value in 0.84 of their responses.  Thus, respondents find the stated 
scenario too incomplete to give a definitive choice response in 
st 0.84” because some of the observed responses of 0 and 100 percent may be rounded 
versions of interior values. 
 
4.4. Estimation of Mean Preferences 
 
Table 3 presents LAD estimates of the parameters β in model (8) for three specifications 
of the attributes x.  To com
  17and ones by 0.999. As discussed in Section 3, LAD estimation of a median regression function is 
e use in place of zero and one. 
The estimates in Table 3 use 3947 of the available 5430 observations, and comprise data 
from 55
y but zero duration.  We 
were c
mit precise inference.  We therefore decided to focus on the 
scenari
insensitive to the specific values that w
6 of the 557 households. (The one deleted household participated in only a single game, 
which was dropped for one of the reasons described here).  The reduction in sample size 
occurred for two reasons.  First, we had to drop 990 games where the software erroneously 
generated alternatives in which outages occur with positive frequenc
oncerned that respondents might be confused by such alternatives, so we dropped the 
games in which they occurred. 
Second, we dropped the 493 observations on games played in scenarios with advance 
warning of electricity outages.  The reduction in consumer welfare caused by outages may 
depend on whether advance warning is given; hence, the utility parameters β should be interacted 
with this feature of the scenario.  However, our sample of 493 observations with advance 
warning was too small to per
os with unannounced outages, for which we have many more observations.  The latter 
also are the scenarios of most interest to policy makers in Israel. 
Recall that the unobserved component of utility in equation (6) has the form 
. ) ( 1 i i ij ij x x u η − =   Thus, the random parameter specification implies that u is heteroskedastic and 
that it is correlated across the games played by a given sample member.  These features of u do 
not affect the consistency of LAD estimation but do affect statistical inference. 
We obtained the standard errors of the parameter estimates shown in Table 3 by cluster 
bootstr
parameters, we 
apping the sample.  Cluster bootstrapping means that, to generate a pseudo-estimate of the 
drew 556 respondents with replacement from the actual sample of 556 
  18respondents and used the data on all of the games played by these persons to re-estimate the 
model. We repeated this process 500 times to generate 500 pseudo estimates of β. The reported 
standar
e group. Respondents 
lf-reported whether their household income is below the Israeli average income (36 percent), at 




d errors are the standard deviations of these 500 pseudo estimates. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
The three columns of Table 3 present estimates of successively richer utility models.  
Column (1) reports estimates of a simple model that takes the attributes of an alternative to be D, 
F, and C.  We further allow the electricity-cost coefficient to vary by incom
se
the average income (
 to answer the question and were assigned to a residual group.  We would have preferred 
to ask respondents to report their household incomes, but this aspect of the questionnaire design 
was not under our control.  Respondents were not told the average Israeli income.  Hence, there 
is reason to question the accuracy of the self-reports of being below or above average. 
In any case, the parameter estimates have the expected negative signs and the standard 
errors indicate that they are statistically precise. Observe that the marginal disutility of electricity 
cost is smaller for higher income households. 
This first model makes the unrealistic assumptions that (a) the disutility of an additional 
outage is the same regardless of its duration and (b) the disutility of an additional m
is the same regardless of the number of outages.  To enable a more flexible description of 
utility, the model in column (2) adds to x the total outage time T = F × D.  This gives the 
following specification of the utility function: 
() ij iC j iD j iF j iT j ij U IncomeGroup C D F T β βββ ε =× + + + + .      (11) 
  19This specification extends Beenstock et al. (1998), who used only attribute T, without separate 
appearance of F and D. 
  Comparing the estimates in columns (1) and (2) shows that adding total outage time T to 
the model has essentially no effect on the electricity-cost coefficients, but it sharply reduces the 
magnitudes of the coefficients on D and F, which are now stat m 
nce they allow for asymmetric marginal effects of D and F. Recall that 
 the interactions do not reject the hypothesis that the utility effect of outages 
does no
istically indistinguishable fro
zero.  The new coefficient on T is negative and is statistically precise.   Nevertheless, we include 
D and F in the model si
we will use the estimated coefficients to compute the willingness to pay (WTP) for reductions in 
outages. The standard errors we report for WTP will account for the imprecision of the estimated 
coefficients on F and D.  
The models in columns (1) and (2) presume that consumer valuation of electricity 
reliability does not depend on the timing of outages.  As described in Section 3, the scenario 
specified for each game contains three timing indicators: season, hour, and weekend/weekday.  
In principle, the reduction in consumer welfare caused by outages may vary with these aspects of 
timing. 
To explore this matter, we interacted D, F, and T with timing indicators.  For simplicity, 
we grouped the off-peak and intermediate hours into a single off-peak category.  We did not 
foresee any reason why the electricity-cost coefficients should vary with the timing of outages 
and, hence, did not interact C with the timing indicators. 
F-tests of
t vary across seasons (p-value 0.11). This result is in line with the general opinion of 
experts in the area and with the fact that there is little seasonal difference in household energy 
consumption in Israel. 
  20With these preliminary results in mind, we present in column (3) a model that interacts D, 
F and T
 in welfare associated with off-peak weekday outages. Notice that the 
estimat
ics and estimated a separate model for each sub-sample.  
e performed three splits of the sample, these being by age, education level, and income 
he model in column (3) of Table 3.  Appendix Table 
A1 pre
two groups, the estimates of the coefficients on F, D, T and their interactions with the timing 
                                                
 with dummy variables that distinguish peak from off-peak weekday hours and weekdays 
relative to the weekend.  Comparison of the estimates in columns (2) and (3) shows that addition 
of the interactions does not materially change the coefficients of the model in column (2), which 
now give the reduction
ed interactions for D and F are much larger than those for T (relative to their off peak 
weekday coefficients). Individually, these interactions effects are not precisely estimated but, 
jointly, they cannot be rejected.
6  In any event, the standard error of the WTP will reflect the 
imprecision of the interaction effects.  
 
Parameter Estimates for Sub-Populations 
It may be that households with different observed characteristics have systematically 
different preferences and expectations.  To investigate this possibility, we split the sample into 
sub-samples with different characterist
W
respectively.  In each case, we estimated t
sents the estimates. 
We first split the sample between households where the respondent was 50 years of age 
or older and those where the respondent was less than 50 years old.  There are 1739 observations 
from 244 "old" households and 2208 observations from 312 "young" households. Comparing the 
 
6 An F test for zero interactions between "peak" and D, F and T has p-value less than 0.01, while a similar test for 
the interaction with D and F only has p-value 0.03. Similarly, an F test for the interactions between "weekend" and 
D, F and T has p value less than 0.01, while a similar test for the interaction with D and F only has p-value 0.12. 
 
  21variables do not significantly differ from one another (p-value 0.45). The only statistically 
significant difference between the age groups is in the coefficients of the cost variable (C) and its 
interact




omists are often concerned about the possibility 
of orde
oughtfulness of the responses may diminish or improve as 
e questioning proceeds.     
ions with the income group (p-value 0.027).   
We next split the sample according to the respondent’s education level. There are 179 
households where the respondent finished college and 377 households where the respondent did 
not. Comparing the two groups, the estimates of the coefficients of F, D, T and their interactions 
with the timing variables again do not significantly differ from one another (p-value 0. 58). In 
this case, the cost coefficients do no differ between the education groups either (p-value 0.28).  
Finally, we split the sample into three inco
olds), average income (119 households), above average (140 households) and households 
that did not provide this information (99 households). In this case, there are statistically 
significant differences in the coefficients of D and F and their interactions with the timing 
variables (p-value 0.004 and 0.08, respectively). 
In sum, there is some evidence that preferences and expectations may vary wit
old characteristics such as age and income, but not education. For simplicity, in what 
follows we ignore these differences. 
 
Ordering Effects 
Survey researchers and experimental econ
ring effects in responses when persons are asked sequences of questions.  Persons may 
tire as they proceed through the questions, but they also may become more familiar with the 
mode of questioning.  Hence, the th
th
  22Recall that each of our households faced five games in each scenario, and that the 
scenari
es and games 4-5 to be the “late” games.  In the other, we defined 
the five
ear to be moderate ordering effects that should give caution to application of 
some o
 the 
os were played one after the other. Ordering effects could occur within each scenario and 
across scenarios.  To investigate these possibilities, we considered two definitions of “early” and 
“late” games.  For each definition, we separately estimated the model of Table 3, column (3), 
using data from the early and late games.  In one definition, we defined games 1-3 within a 
scenario to be the “early” gam
 games of the first scenario to be the early games and those of the second scenario to be 
the late games. 
We found that splitting the data in these ways had essentially no effect on the four 
estimated cost coefficients. However, some of the nine duration/frequency coefficients 
moderately differed when estimated on different data subsamples, to an extent that appears not 
attributable solely to finite-sample statistical variation.  As a consequence, some of our 
willingness to pay estimates remained unchanged, while others measurably differed.  In sum, we 
found what app
f our estimates.  However, the observed effects were neither strong nor pervasive enough 
to render the estimates unusable.  We have no basis to conjecture about the cognitive processes 
that may generate ordering effects.  We think this is an important subject for future research. 
 
4.5. Willingness to Pay for Reliability 
 
In this section, we use the parameter estimates in column (3) of Table 3 to estimate the 
willingness of a consumer with mean preferences to pay for electricity reliability.  Willingness to 
pay (WTP) equals the negative of the ratio of the marginal utility of an outage attribute to
  23marginal utility of electricity cost.  The frequency and duration of outages are negatively valued 
money the household is willing to pay for a reduction in 
these attributes. 





n when there is one outage per season.  We find that WTP declines with F, 
                                                
attributes, so we report the amount of 
Table 4 evaluates WTP for a unit reduction in F and D at specified values of (F, D) and 
specified timings for outages.  Each column concerns one of the three timing scenarios: weekday 
peak, weekday off-peak, and weekend off-peak. There are no peak hours on weekends. 
To enhance comparability of the findings for D and F, the entries in the table divide the 
WTP for a reduction in D by the number of outages F, and they divide the WTP for a reduction 
in F by the durat
nces is willing to pay for a one-minute reduction in outage, where the reduction may be 
achieved by reducing the duration or frequency of outages. 
For specificity, Table 4 considers a household with average income. We 
e electricity-cost parameters for households with below average and above average 
incomes, so their WTP are fixed multiples of the calculations presented in the table.   





The top panel of the table shows WTP for one-minute reductions achieved by reducing 
the duration of outages.  Consider the findings for weekends.  The estimate of 0.98  for F = 1 
indicates that the consumer is willing to pay 0.98 US dollars for a one-minute reduction achieved 
by reducing duratio
 
7 The standard errors of the estimates also change, but not necessarily proportionally. 
 
  24being 0.36 US dollars per minute when there are five outages per season. 
e table shows that WTP during peak hours on weekdays is very similar to that during 
weeken
ally very imprecise, so 
we will
 a duration of 60 minutes.  WTP declines with D, being 
25 US 
ecise, even though the coefficients 
on F an
r of outages than for 
shorter
Th
ds.  In contrast, consumers place little or no value on reductions in the duration of 
outages during off-peak hours.  The estimates are small in magnitude and, for the most part, are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows WTP for one-minute reductions achieved by reducing 
the duration of outages.  The estimates for D = 10 and D = 30 are statistic
 focus on the much more precise estimates for D ≥ 60. 
 Consider the findings for weekends.  The estimate of 0.42 for D = 60 indicates that the 
consumer is willing to pay  0.42 US dollars for a one-minute reduction achieved by reducing the 
frequency of outages when outages have
cents per minute when outages have last for five hours.  The table shows that WTP during 
weekdays is very similar to that during weekends, both for peak and for off-peak hours.  It is 
noteworthy that most of the WTP estimates are statistically pr
d D and their interactions with the timing variables usually are not.  
In sum, the WTP for a one-minute reduction in outage time is similar during weekends 
and during peak hours on weekdays. Consumers, however, value differently how this one minute 
reduction in outage time is achieved. They are willing to pay more when a one minute reduction 
in outage time is obtained by reducing the duration of outages than by reducing the number of 
outages during the season. During the weekday off peak hours, this pattern is reversed as 
consumers are willing to pay somewhat more for reductions in the numbe
 durations per outage.  
The welfare cost of outages is often expressed in terms of money per KWh of electricity 
  25unsupplied. To translate the estimated WTP amounts of Table 4 into this measure, we multiply 
them by 60 minutes and divide by the average KWh of electricity consumption, which varies by 
timing scenario and income group.
8 Table 5 presents these estimates in US dollars per KWh 
unsupplied. 
Our estimates are somewhat higher than those estimated by Beenstock et al. (1998) for 
the Isra
analysis of stated choice probabilities.  Comparisons should also be made with 
caution
eli economy in 1991-1992.  The estimates are more in line with those reported for the 
United States by Doane et al. (1998) and Woo et al. (1991).  Comparison of our estimates with 
earlier ones by other authors should be made with caution because our methodology differs from 
that of previous work.  Whereas the earlier estimates are based on analysis of stated choices, ours 
is based on 
 because the time periods differ and because there is no inherent reason why WTP should 
be the same in different countries and/or in different periods. 
 
4.6. The Dispersion of Preferences 
 
Recall that we assumed a random-coefficient model for utility, with ii b β η =+.  Sections 
4.4 and 4.5 analyzed the mean preferences b and the derived WTP of persons with these 
preferences.  In this section, we study the dispersion of preferences.  Our analysis is quite simple.  
 does not require parametric distributional assumptions on preferences.  Nor does it employ the 
 methods typically applied to random-coefficients models 
estimated with actual or stated choice data. 




8   We use the actual KWh consumed for the households in the sample, which is an average for the whole bi-
monthly billing cycle. We adjust this average KWh to the different scenarios using the national averages for 
electricity consumption in the different scenarios and their relative frequency during the billing cycle.  
  26Consider sample member i.  We first apply our estimate of b to equation (6) to estimate 
the un -specific  observed utility components ui2.  We then estimate the person preference 
parameters ηi by solving the equations  . ) ( 1 2 2 i i i i x x u η − =   
We can solve exactly for η when the number of observations (games) per person is equal 
to the number of regressors in the model (the dimension of η). When the number of observations 
per person is larger than the number of regressors, we compute the least squares solution for η. 
We use the model in column (3) of Table 3 to compute .  Our computations allow the 
valuatio





n of outages to vary with their timing but assume that timing affects only the mean 
preference b and not the individual component ηi. While somewhat restrictive, this assumption 
greatly increases the number of observa
has five random components.  Hence, we can compute η for the 448 sample members who 
played five or more games. 
Table 6 presents selected quantiles of the estimated distribution of βi.  The findings hav
in features that warrant attention.  First, we find considerable dispersion of preferences 
across the population.  In each case, the interquartile range of the preference parameter is large 
relative to its mean value.  Second, although the majority of the estimates of all coefficients are 
negative as expected, sizable fractions are positive (see Table 7).  Positive values are contrary to 
standard consumer theory, which presumes that households should negatively value electricity 
outages and price. 
Some of the dispersion and positivity of the estimated coefficients may be a consequence 
of the probability rounding discussed in Sections 3 and 4.3.  Recall that the LAD estimation we 
used to estimate mean preferences in the population is robust to rounding.  However, there is no 
robust way to estimate individual preference parameters.  Our use of equation (6) to estimate 
  27person-specific βi inevitably rests on the rounded probability values that subjects report and, in 
particular, on the way that we interpret reports of zero probability. 
Rounding may partially explain our findings on the distribution of individual preferences, 
but we 
4.7. Ma
alue distribution.  In this section we present findings based 
n the model with weaker assumptions discussed in Section 3.4.  Here we assume only that each 
y the maximum score method. 





doubt that this is the entire story.  Our utility model, as any such model, can no more than 
approximately describe consumer behavior.  The model delivers sensible findings regarding 
mean preferences, but more questionable ones about the full distribution of preferences.  This 
suggests that the model should not be taken as the final word when analyzing consumer 
preferences for electricity reliability. 
 
ximum Score Estimation of Mean Willingness-to-Pay 
 
  The empirical findings presented in Sections 4.4 through 4.6 are based on the mixed-logit 
model developed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.  As discussed earlier, this model has many appealing 
properties.  However, it makes the hard-to-motivate assumption that each respondent i believes 
(εij, εij) to be i. i. d. with the extreme v
o
person i places subjective median zero on εij − εik, and we appl












r is the elicited probability of choosing alternative 2 in game r.  The score function can 
be written  
  28{} 21
11 1
() ( ) 0
i R NN
ii r
Sb R y I x x b
== =
=− − − ≥                                                 (12)  ii r i r i r ∑∑ ∑
where I is the indicator function taking the value one when the expression within the curly 
brackets is true and zero otherwise. Thus, one loses a point when the value of y differs from that 
of the indicator function. 
The maximum score estimate is the set of values of b that minimize the number of wrong 
predictions, which is 
{} 21
11
() ( ) 0
i R N
∗
ir i r i r
ir
Sb y I x x b
==
=− − ≥ ∑∑ .                                                         (13) 
Observe that  is a step function.  Hence, standard derivative-based local optimization 
 a finer grid within this neighborhood.  We do not report confidence 
interva
 identified models is not available. We only know that the estimates are 
consistent under the maintained assump
To ease the computational burden, we estimate simpler utility function specifications than 
specifications that eliminate all interaction terms.   These are 
1
S∗b
routines cannot be applied.  Instead, we perform a grid search, which guarantees that we find the 
global minimum of S∗b.  We first use a coarse grid to locate a neighborhood of the global 
minimum and then search
ls or other measures of precision because asymptotic distribution theory for MS 
estimation of partially
tions. 
those underlying the estimates in Table 3. Specifically, we estimate parameters for two 
11 1
ij iC j iT j ij UC T β βε =+ +                                                            (14a) 
2 UCD F
22 2 2 . ij iC j iD j iF j ij β ββ ε =+++                                             (14b) 
In each case, the mean values of the parameters can at most be identified up to scale.  To fix the 
scale, we impose the normalization  1 C b = − .  Hence, there is one parameter to estimate in the 
  29first specification of the utility function, 
1
T b  and two parameters in the second one, 
2
D b   and
2
F b . 
  Consider the first specification.  We found that the minimum value of S∗boccurs in the 
short interval [ 1.2772, 1.2223]. −−   For comparison, LAD estima
yields   = -0.0010206, which imply 
tion of the mixed logit model 
1






b  = 1.31.  Thus, t
MS estimates for 




b  are very similar. 
Consider the second specification.  We found that the minimum value of  occurs in 
the two small regions  116.34]) ( 5.89,[ 116.66, 116.65]). −− − ∪ −− −  Thus, the 
estimate of the first parameter is up to 0.01 rounding) and the estimate of the 
 = -0.000597,  
S∗b
( 5.90,[ 116.58,
 essentially a point (





D b  = -0.0048388, and 
2  = -0.1060176, implying  F b
D
C b












b  are moderately larger than the MS estimates, 






This paper makes two contributions. First, it extends the Manski (1999) approach to the 
but not very different. 
We are encouraged that the WTP estimates obtained by LAD and MS estimation of 
simple utility functions spe  be useful to 
compute MS estimates of richer utility specifications.  However, MS estimation of long 
parameter vectors, such as those estimated by LAD in Table 3, is computationally very difficult.  
Hence, we suffice with the simp r specifications considered here. 
  30estimation of random utility models with random coefficients using elicited choice probabilities 
instead of stated choices. The linear mixed logit model developed in Section 3 requires weaker 
parametric restrictions than conventional mixed-logit analysis of stated choices and is much 
asier to implement.  However, this model still requires certain distributional assumptions, 
amely symmetry of the cross-sectional distribution of preferences and the i. i. d. extreme-value 
the subjective distribution of ε.  The linear model estimable by maximum score 
eakens the latter assumption considerably. 






Second, the paper reports the first application of the "elicited choice probability" 
methodology. We estimate preferences for electricity reliability in Israel. We use the estimated 
mean preferences to estimate willingness to pay for reductions in the duration of electricity 
outages. We find that households with mean preferences are willing to pay significant amounts 
of money for electricity reliability. During weekends and peak weekday hours, consumers are 
willing to pay more  for a one minute reduction in outage time obtained by reducing average 
duration of outages than by reducing the number of outages. However, during the weekend off 
peak hours, this pattern is reversed. The 
nces in a straightforward manner, and we find that preferences for electricity reliability 
exhibit considerable dispersion in the population.  
As described in the paper, eliciting choice probabilities from a sample of households 
proved to be no more difficult than eliciting stated choices.  Choice probabilities allow 
consumers to express uncertainty about their actual behavior whereas stated choices do not. 
Thus, it seems that we can get "more for the buck" by adopting this approach in applied research. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Scenarios       
    
Scena
    
No advance warning, off peak, weekday, winter  587  10.8 
nce warning, peak, weekday, summer 
rio Count  Percent 
584  10.8 
kend, summer  537  9.9 




No advance warning, intermediate, weekend, winter  568  10.5 
No advance warning, intermediate, weekday, summer  569  10.5 
No advance warning, off peak, weekend, winter  524  9.7 
No advance warning, off peak, weekday, summer  531  9.8 
No advance warning, peak, weekday, winter  538  9.9 
No advance warning, intermediate, wee
No adva
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Table 2: Tabulation of Choice Probabilities
      
 
  (for alternative 1) 
      
Percent  Cum. 




0 432  8.0  8.0 
0.0  8.0 
0.5  8.5 
7.4  15.8 
0.0  15.8 
0.2  16.0 
11.8  27.9 
0.2  28.1 
30 541  10.0  38.0 
35 3  0.1  38.1 
40 488  9.0  47.1 
45 12  0.2  47.3 
49 5  0.1  47.4 
50 252  4.6  52.0 
51 3  0.1  52.1 
55 10  0.2  52.3 
60 534  9.8  62.1 
65 4  0.1  62.2 
70 480  8.8  71.0 
75 2  0.0  71.1 
80 645  11.9  82.9 
85 11  0.2  83.1 
90 433  8.0  91.1 
95 17  0.3  91.4 
99 12  0.2  91.6 
100 454  8.4  100.0 
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Table 3. LAD Estimates of Utility Function Parameters
1
Dependent variable: log probability ratio   
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Cost:  baseline  -0.00 016 -0.00148 
  [0.00032] [0.0003 [0.00032] 
      
         Dummy for average income  0.000 0.0008 0.00073 
  [0.000 [0.0003 [0.00036] 
      
        Dummy for above ave  inco e  0.001 0.0015 0.00128 
  [0.000 [0.0003 [0.00038] 
      
        Dummy for missing in e  0.000 0.0005 0.00048 
  [0.000 [0.0004 [0.00046] 
      
Duration -0.00 -0.00082  0.00122 
  [0.000 [0.0010 [0.00189] 
      
Frequency -0.11 -0.0113  -0.0049 
  [0.014 [0.0300 [0.0565] 
      
Total Outage Time (T = Fx --  -0.0009 -0.00080 
   [0.0002 [0.00041] 
      
Duration X Weekend  --  --  -0.0039 
     [0.0022] 
 --  --   
Duration X Peak      -0.0032 
     [0.0024] 
      
Frequency X Weekend  --  --  5 
     [0.0646] 
      
uency X Peak  --  --  0.0233 
  [0.0676] 
      
T X Weekend  --  --  0.00009 
     [0.0005] 
      
T X Peak  --  --  -0.00022 
     [0.00049] 
      
      
Observations 3947  3947  3947 
           
1 Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications. 
142 -0.0 3 
0] 
76  8 
35]  5] 
rage m 36  1 
35]  6] 
com 38  5 
45]  5] 
467
47]  8] 
82 
9]  ] 
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Table 4: M ge Time
1
(Households with erage Income) 
 
ean WTP (US dollars) for a 1-minute Reduction in Outa
 Av
 (1)  (3) 
eduction in D  Weekday, Peak  Weekda  Off-Peak Weekend, ff-Peak 
0.88  - 0.98 
 (0.49) ( (0.
F=2 0.59  05  0.60 
( (0.
F=3 0.49  0.47 
 (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) 
0.40 
 (0.14) ( (0.
F=5 0.42  16  0.36 
( (0.
   
eduction in F  Weekday, Peak  Weekda  Off-Peak Weekend, ff-Peak 
 -0.24  1.51 
 (1.08) ( (1.
D=30 0.12  28  0.64 
(0.31) ( (0.
D=60 0.21  0.42 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.17) 
  5  0.35 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.
D=120 0.25  25  0.31 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.
D=150 0.26  24  0.29 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
0.27  24  0.28 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.
D=300 0.28  24  0.25 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.
     
r-bootstrapped standard errors are in paren ses. 
(2) 
R y,    O
F=1  0.12 
0.45)  48) 
0.
 (0.25)  0.18)  24) 
0.11 
F=4 0.45  0.14 
0.08)  13) 
0.
 (0.13)  0.07)  11) 
   
R y,    O
D=10 0.38 
1.56)  13) 
0.









































5 ost (US dollars per KWh un
                                                                
Table  : Mean Outage C supplied)
1
                                      
 






F=4 21.38  19.24 
     









 (4.26) (5.20) (3.81) 
   
Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) 





F=1  2.37 
  23.58) 
2
26.80)  23.12) 
F=2  8.38  3.26 
  11.85) 
2
10.92)  11.54) 
F=3  3.71  6.81 
 (8.35) (6.22) 
8.58 
(7.95) 
 (6.87) (4.55) (6.35) 
17.37  F=5 19.98  9.65 
 (6.14) (4.13) (5.52) 
ct n in io kday, P ay, Off-
22.39 
nd, Off-
D=10  11.56 




  14.82) 
10.06 15.32 20.32 
27.28)  16.97) 
D=60 
 (6.19) 
11.50 14.85 16.85 
11.35)  (8.07) 
D=90 
 (4.05) 








12.94 14.38 13.38 
(4.46) (4.07) 
 (3.72) (4.46) 















  38Table 6: Distribution of Individual β's 
         
  10%  25% 50% 75% 90%  N 
       
eekday, off 
k   
 
W
pea       
F β   -2.3389 -0.504  -0.0903  0.2409  1.1457  448 
         
D β   -0.08 -0.01 89  71 
         
-0.00 0.0114  20  0.038 448  9 
 
T β   -0.0 -0.0036  -0.00 0.0024 0.012
       
Wee peak       
100  03  6  448 
   
kday,   
F β   -2.3 -0.4807 -0.0 1.169
   
156  6 0.2642  7  0  448 
        
D β   -0.0 -0.0203  -0.00 0.0082 0.035
   
921  52  7  448 
        




peak       
  -0.0005  0.0022 
  
0.0124  448 
      
kend, o
   
F β   -2.3 -0.5435  -0.1 .2014 1.106 48 
       
784  297  0 2  4
   
D β   -0.0 -0.0210  -0.0 .0076 0.035
       
927  058  0 0  448 
   
T β   -0.0 -0.0035  -0.00 0.012
   
       
099  02  0.0025  7  448 
      
 
C β  (in 1)  -0.0 -0.0066  -0.0 0.002 0.007
       
come= 346  011  6  156 
 
  C β  (income=2)  -0.0 -0.0086  -0.00 0.002 97 
   
171  17  0.0002  7 
      
  C β  (income=3)  -0.019 -0.0065  -0.0015  0.0071  116 
  
0.0011 
       














Table 7: Percentage of Negative Coefficients 
 
Weekdays 
peak  Week ays peak  Weeke  off 
peak    off  d nds
F β   5   9 56 62 
D β 55 62    53   
T β   54 54   
      





C β   62 70 65 77 
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Table A1. LAD Estimates of Utility Function Parameters for Sub-samples 
Dependent variable: 
log probability ratio            
     by Age (years)    by Education    by Income 
  Full sample    50 or older  less than 50    college  non-college     below average   average   above average  nonresponse  
                        
Cost  -    -  -    -  -    -0.00110***  -0.000915*** -0.000436 -0.00103*** 
                 (0.00025)  (0.00027)  (0.00027)  (0.00039) 
                        
Cost: ( baseline)  -0.00148    -0.00151***  -0.00137***    -0.00107  -0.00167***    -  -  -  - 
  [0.00032]  (0.000470)  (0.000371)  (0.000750) (0.000349)         
                      
  Dummy for average income  0.00073    0.000889  0.000561    0.000341  0.00102**    -  -  -  - 
  [0.00036]  (0.000570)  (0.000448)  (0.000862) (0.000418)         
                      
  Dummy for above average income  0.00128    0.00212***  0.000858*    0.000624  0.00200***    -  -  -  - 
  [0.00038]  (0.000508)  (0.000440)  (0.000761) (0.000500)         
                      
  Dummy for missing answer  0.00048    0.0000362  0.000837*    0.000559  0.000467    -  -  -  - 
  [0.00046]  (0.000589)  (0.000482)  (0.00100)  (0.000465)         
                       
Duration 0.00122    0.00158  0.000926    -0.000409  0.00239    0.00753***  -0.000525  -0.00266  -0.000630 
  [0.00189]  (0.00261)  (0.00250)  (0.00369)  (0.00202)   (0.0024)  (0.0035)  (0.0050)  (0.0039) 
                      
Frequency  -0.0049   0.00925  -0.0372  -0.110  0.0661   0.152**  -0.0864  -0.0993 -0.114 
  [0.0565]  (0.0789)  (0.0660)  (0.0969)  (0.0565)   (0.072)  (0.096)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
                      
Total Outage Time (T = F x  D)  -0.00080    -0.00100*  -0.000548    -0.000143  -0.00124***    -0.00192***  -0.000509  -0.000321  0.0000644 
  [0.00041]  (0.000548)  (0.000489)  (0.000753) (0.000408)   (0.00046)  (0.00067)  (0.00099)  (0.00080) 
                      
Duration X Weekend  -0.0039    -0.00542*  -0.00209    -0.00174  -0.00477*    -0.00657**  -0.000476  -0.00828  0.00113 
  [0.0022]  (0.00315)  (0.00291)  (0.00463)  (0.00264)   (0.0030)  (0.0058)  (0.0053)  (0.0045) 
                        
Duration X Peak  -0.0032    -0.00631**  0.000157    0.00122  00392    -0.00968***  -0.00205  -0.000426  -0.000640 
  [0.0024]  (0.00309)  (0.00318)   (0.00470) (0.00306)   (0.0031)  (0.0045)  (0.0059)  (0.0067) 
-0.
  42                        
Frequency X Weekend  -0.039 -0.0531  -0.0898  0.165 
  [0.0646]  (0.0915)  (0.0812)  (0.116)  (0.0718)   (0.097)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
       
Frequency X Peak 0. -0. 0636  0. 0156  -0.115  0.0181  0.105  0.192 
       
eekend  0. 9  0. 64  -0. 9  -0. 5 0. 05  
[0.0 05]  (0. 6)  (0. 6) 0.000910) (0.000516)
       
0. 9*  -0. 4  -0. 2  .00144 
(0.00062)  (0.00091)  (0.0011)  0.0013) 
       
bservations  1379  842  1034  92 
  
n 5 tion        
5    -0.0692  0.00411    0.124  -0.131*    -0.137 
              
  0233    00635  0.   144  -0.  
  [0.0676]  (0.0972)  (0.0827)  (0.119)  (0.0786)   (0.093)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.17) 
               
T  X  W 0000 0004 00035   00089 0006 0.00104  0.0000999  0.000391  -0.00161 
  0   00064 00058   (    (0.00065)  (0.0011)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
               
T X Peak  -0.00022    0.000313  -0.000778    -0.00120  0.000134    0010 00014 00065 -0
  [0.00049]  (0.000669)  (0.000614)  (0.000928) (0.000575)   (
                      
               
O 3947  1739  2208  1252  2695   6
                                   
1 Boostrapped standard errors based o 00 replica s.            
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